Data and Code for: Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
收藏ICPSR2022-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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资源简介：
Deferred Acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that—in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments—participants frequently play seemingly dominated, significantly costly, strategies that avoid small chances of good outcomes. We show theoretically why, with<br>expectations-based loss aversion, this behavior may be partly intentional. Reanalyzing existing experimental data on random serial dictatorship (a restriction of DA), we<br>show that such reference-dependent preferences, with a degree and distribution of loss<br>aversion that explain common levels of risk aversion elsewhere, fit the data better than<br>no-loss-aversion preferences.<br>
提供机构：
Cornell University, Hebrew University, NBER; Harvard University
创建时间：
2022-01-01
