Replication Data for: Why Kill Deposed Leaders? Regime Types and Post-Tenure Fates

Past research has argued that leaders care about their post-tenure fates and that consideration of these circumstances can motivate policy choices. But, so far, there has been little theorizing on why some successors let leaders walk away while others meet more dismal ends. I provide a regime-based argument for this variation that predicts that personalist leaders will be more likely to experience negative post-tenure fates (exile, imprisonment, and death) than democratic and other autocratic counterparts. The reason is that personalist leaders' legitimacy is uniquely tied to their personal traits. So long as the former despot is living and near, he poses a threat to his successors. I test my argument on a sample of leaders (1945-2004) and find that the legitimacy argument predicts leader outcomes even while accounting for rival arguments such as a need for retribution, means of exit, militarization of regime, and past history.