Replication Data for: Taxation and Social Intermediaries: Experimental Evidence from Lagos, Nigeria

Tax collection is difficult in low-income countries, and bureaucracies exist alongside non-state actors that collect “taxes” and provide services informally. Can weak states leverage the strengths of these actors to collect taxes, or should they invest in state-building on their own? We conducted a field experiment in Lagos, Nigeria that randomly assigned market vendors to tax appeals from state or non-state agents. Contrary to expectations, we find that non-state actors are not effective messengers of tax appeals. Tax appeals delivered by representatives of the marketplace association, an important social intermediary in this context, were ineffective even at higher levels of trust and message credibility. We found, however, that messages delivered by state agents were sometimes effective in spurring registration and tax payment, especially among ethnic minorities. This study underlines the importance of social intermediaries in shaping the social contract, and it draws attention to the uneven effects of these kinds of institutions within populations.