Replication Data for: Aid, Attitudes and Insurgency: Evidence from Development Projects in Northern Afghanistan

Prevalent counterinsurgency theories posit that small development aid projects can help stabilize regions in conflict. A widely assumed mechanism runs through citizen attitudes, often known as “winning hearts and minds.” In this formulation, aid leads to economic benefits and sways public perceptions about the government, leading to more cooperation and eventually to less violence. Following a pre-registered research design, we test this claim using a difference-in-differences approach, leveraging original survey data and new geo-coded information about small German-sponsored infrastructure projects in northern Afghanistan. We find that aid improves perceived economic conditions, but erodes attitudes towards government and improves perceptions of insurgents. These attitudinal effects do not translate into any change in insurgent or pro-government violence nor to changes in territorial control in the two years following the projects. We develop and then test a set of potential mechanisms. Projects that include robust local consultation are able to avoid the negative attitudinal effects, resulting in a null effect on public opinion. Projects create most of their economic and attitudinal effects during implementation, with null effects after completion. These findings challenge the “heart and minds” theory, but complement the wider literature on legitimacy, suggesting that foreign aid can improve human development but may not contribute meaningfully to political stabilization.