Data and Code for: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution

How do radical reforms of the state shape economic development over time? In 1790, France's first Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom's organization to set up new administrative entities and local capitals. In a subset of new artificial departments, the choice of local capitals at the expense of rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. Comparing capitals with other candidate cities that were not ultimately chosen, we study how changes in local administrative presence affect economic development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. This gradually translates into higher levels of public goods provision, while economic benefits only materialize in the longer run. One hundred years after the reform, capitals are 40% more populated than other candidate cities. Our results shed new light on the dynamic and redistributive impacts of state-building in the context of one of the most ambitious administrative reforms ever implemented.