Replication Data for: Governing Through Gridlock: Bill Composition under Divided Government

What is the effect of divided government on issue attention in state legislatures? Much of the research on the effects of divided government examines how it affects the enactment of significant legislation but does not consider other effects on legislative behavior. In this paper, I propose a new theory of the relationship between divided government and legislative activity. Regardless of partisan control, reelection-minded legislators face pressure to deliver benefits to voters, yet divided government can make substantive policy change difficult. As a result of these competing pressures, under divided government legislators increasingly turn their focus to bills that benefit their local constituents, which are seen as easier to enact and allow them to engage in advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. I find that under divided government, legislators introduce bills at the same rate, but the type of legislation introduced shifts away from statewide policy changes and towards district-specific legislation.