THE SOCIAL METACOGNITION OF MORAL JUDGMENT

How do others’ moral judgments shape our own? Across two studies, we examined the metacognitive processes underlying judgment revision using a modified two-response paradigm. Participants gave rapid intuitive responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas, rated their confidence, and then reconsidered their judgments after viewing responses attributed to others. In Study 1, exposure to disagreement from two peers increased the likelihood of response change, reduced confidence, and promoted moderation, whereas alignment fostered more extreme judgments. In Study 2, conflict with a peer’s deliberated response carried greater weight than conflict with their intuitive response, prompting greater deliberation and judgment moderation. Across both studies, subjective confidence consistently reduced susceptibility to social influence, highlighting its role as a metacognitive anchor. The specific moral stance (deontological vs. utilitarian) did not consistently predict revision. Together, these findings demonstrate the malleability of moral intuitions, especially under conditions of low confidence and reasoned disagreement, and underscore the inherently social and dynamic nature of moral decision-making.