Reasons or Rationalisations: Inconsistencies in Endorsing, Articulating and Applying Moral Principles

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. In recent years, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real or artefactual phenomenon. In one challenge to the existence of dumbfounding, participants' judgments were attributed to either harm-based reasons (believing an action may lead to harm) or to norm-based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Attribution was determined by participants' endorsing of either reason. Participants who endorsed a reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non-significance. The current research aims to test the claim that participants’ judgments in the dumbfounding paradigm can be attributed to these reasons. We argue that endorsing alone does not provide evidence that a judgment is grounded in a given reason. We present two studies that develop more robust exclusion criteria accounting for (a) participants' ability to articulate either reason, and (b) the application of harm-based reasons across differing contexts. Study 1 included an open-ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of either harm-based or norm-based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Study 2, building on Study 1, included three questions assessing the consistency with which people apply harm-based reasons. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm-based reasons, and further evidence for dumbfounding was found.

道德困惑现象指个体即便无法给出理由，仍坚持某种道德判断的情况。近年来，关于道德困惑是否为真实存在或人为制造的现象的讨论日益增多。在针对道德困惑存在性的一个挑战中，研究者的判断被归因于基于伤害的理由（认为某一行为可能导致伤害）或基于规范的理由（违反道德规范本身即为错误）。归因的确定取决于参与者对某一理由的认同。认同某一理由的参与者被排除在分析之外，道德困惑的实例似乎因而失去了显著性。当前研究旨在检验关于在道德困惑范式下，参与者的判断可以归因于这些理由的主张。我们认为，仅仅认同并不能作为判断基于某一理由的充分证据。我们提出了两项研究，以发展更为稳健的排除标准，这些标准考虑到（a）参与者阐述某一理由的能力，以及（b）在不同情境下应用基于伤害的理由。第1项研究在呈现道德场景后立即提供了开放式回答选项。回答被编码为提及基于伤害的理由或基于规范的理由。如果参与者既阐述了又认同了某一理由，则将其排除在分析之外。使用这些修订后的排除标准，我们发现了道德困惑的证据，这通过选择承认没有理由的方式来衡量。第2项研究在第1项研究的基础上，包括了三个问题，以评估人们应用基于伤害的理由的一致性。正如预期的那样，很少有参与者能够一致地应用、阐述和认同基于伤害的理由，并发现了进一步的道德困惑证据。