Lucretian presentism : an internally consistent rival to four-dimensionalism

Callender suggests that presentism can survive the major logical and scientific challenges raised against it but believes that the resultant product is wounded and unlovely (Callender 2000: S588). Many of the purported difficulties that presentism are thought to face arise from its scrupulous adherence to belief in the non-existence of wholly past and future objects. One response that presentists can make is to supply surrogates for the absent entities by means of tensed properties, possible worlds and haecceities. One very particular version of such a response, called “Lucretian presentism” in this text, is formulated and tested against the challenges posed to presentism in the philosophical literature arising from the non-existence of wholly non-present individuals, challenges expressed in terms of truthmaking, singular propositions and cross-temporal relations. It is assessed and found to survive these ordeals. In preparation for evaluating how expensive (‘unlovely’) this version of presentism is, this thesis first spells out the nature of presentism and distinguishes it from four-dimensionalism. The existence of a ‘third way’ that accommodates the driving intuitions of both presentism and four-dimensionalism is then denied. It is found that Lucretian presentism does have ontological costs -including as it does belief in matter, tensed properties, propositions, Platonic universals, that haecceities can be formed from properties and the rejection of direct reference theory - but that this package fits together neatly, is credible and has other benefits. This thesis was scanned from the print manuscript for digital preservation and is copyright the author. Researchers can access this thesis by asking their local university, institution or public library to make a request on their behalf.