Replication data for: Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers

The debate over the relationship between the location of industry and the incidence of import barriers has been miscast. Three problems cast doubt on the findings reported in the endogenous protection literature. First, geographic concentration is widely used as a proxy for political concentration (i.e., the spread of industry across political districts), al-though these two variables hardly work in lockstep. Second, measures of geographic concentration typically ignore the spatial relationship among units like counties or states in which lumpy industries make their home, thereby often failing to discern concentration where it exists. Third, in those few studies in which political concentration receives any direct attention at all, non-monotonic effects and interaction terms are seldom tested, de-spite their grounding in theories of interest group politics more generally. This paper corrects for all three problems. The results indicate that geographically concentrated but politically dispersed industries are the ones most likely to receive relief from imports, al-though a handful of very large industries benefit from being politically concentrated. The paper thus reveals how to reconcile the two competing hypotheses around which one of endogenous protection theory's most enduring debates has taken shape.