Replication Data for: IMF: International Migration Fund

Existing models of international organizations focus on the strategic and commercial interests of major shareholders to explain why some countries secure better deals from international organizations. Focusing on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that the Fund's major shareholders pressure the IMF to minimize short-term adjustment costs in the borrowing country when they host a large number of the country's nationals. Stringent loan packages often exacerbate short-term economic distress in the borrowing country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Analyzing all IMF programs from 1978 to 2014, we assess our hypothesis that IMF borrowers with larger diasporas in the major IMF shareholder countries tend to secure better arrangements from the IMF. Our findings show that when migration pressures on the G5 countries increase, borrowing countries receive larger loan disbursements and fewer conditions.