Replication Data for: Comrades in Arms? Rebel Leadership Roles and Coups in Rebel Regimes

Why do some winning rebel groups build loyal postwar militaries, while others do not? Surprisingly, though victorious rebel political and military elites cooperate successfully to seize sovereign power, they often struggle to share it. In roughly one-third of rebel regimes, military elites attempt to depose their leaders through military coups. I contend that postwar coup risk is primarily shaped by the wartime roles of rebel leaders. Rebel leaders that occupy a frontline role—exposing themselves to the hazards of the conflict theater—establish regimes less likely to suffer postwar coups. Frontline leaders win greater prestige and stronger legitimacy among military audiences. Further, frontline leaders’ greater proximity to their military commanders allows them to develop institutional structures that more effectively reduce military autonomy. However, remote leaders, who are absent from the conflict theater, exercise weaker postwar control over the armed forces, resulting in greater coup risk. I find support for this theory using original cross-national data on all rebel regimes and the wartime roles of victorious rebel leaders between 1945 and 2010. A controlled case comparison of civil–military relations in two rebel regimes—Guinea-Bissau and Uganda—further illustrates the mechanisms tying wartime roles to postwar coups.为何部分获胜的反叛团体能够建立起忠诚的战后军队，而另一些则无法做到？令人意外的是，尽管获胜的反叛政治与军事精英能够通力合作夺取主权政权，但他们往往难以共享权力。在约三分之一的反叛政权中，军事精英曾试图通过军事政变推翻其领导人。本文认为，战后政变风险主要由反叛领导人的战时角色塑造。那些身处前线、直面冲突战场危险的反叛领导人，其所建立的政权更不容易遭遇战后政变。前线领导人能够在军方群体中获得更高声望与更强合法性。此外，前线领导人与麾下军事指挥官的接触更为紧密，借此能够构建更有效的制度框架以削弱军方自主权。与之相反，远离冲突战场的远程领导人则对武装部队的战后管控能力更弱，进而带来更高的政变风险。本文使用1945年至2010年间所有反叛政权及获胜反叛领导人战时角色的原创跨国数据，为该理论提供了实证支撑。通过对几内亚比绍与乌干达这两个反叛政权的军民关系进行受控案例比较，本文进一步阐明了战时角色与战后政变之间的作用机制。