Data and Code for: The Decline of Too Big To Fail
收藏ICPSR2025-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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资源简介：
For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170% higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of "too big to fail."
提供机构：
Australian National University; Stanford University
创建时间：
2025-01-01
