Replication Data for: Rebel Group Substitutes and Peace Agreement Amnesties

Why do governments grant amnesties to rebels after civil wars? Scholars argue that governments use amnesties to signal commitment to peace or prevent spoiling by rebel leaders. However, other reforms are stronger signals of commitment than amnesties and rebel leaders are almost never prosecuted following peace agreements, with or without amnesty. Thus, amnesties do not prevent leaders from undermining the peace. Instead, I argue amnesties protect rank and file rebels from post-war prosecution. When rebel foot soldiers could join another group, they can use the threat of exit to force their leaders to negotiate amnesties and ensure they are implemented. Using data on peace agreement provisions and implementation, coupled with a new measure of substitute rebel groups, I show that governments grant amnesties when faced with multiple similar rebel groups. Finally, I find that implementing amnesties prevents war recurrence when there are substitute groups but does nothing without them.