Data and Code for: Vertical Integration and Cream Skimming of Profitable Referrals: The Case of Hospital-Owned Skilled Nursing Facilities
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This is data and code that accompanies the following journal article:<br><br>We examine whether
vertical integration of hospitals and skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) could
lessen competition by foreclosing rival SNFs’ access to lucrative referrals. We
find that it could: among integrated providers, a one percent increase in SNF reimbursement
for a given patient discharged from the upstream hospital increases the self-referral
rate to the hospital’s downstream SNF(s) by 1.8 percent. We find no evidence of
offsetting benefits for patients and payers: these increased self-referrals have
an imprecisely estimated zero effect on patient outcomes and Medicare spending.<br>
提供机构：
ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research
创建时间：
2026-03-24
