Dataset and Supplementary Videos for "The Evolution of Altruistic Rationality Provides a Solution to Social Dilemmas via Rational Reciprocity"

Supplementary Video 1 (SV 1) depicts the evolutionary progression of the Prisoner's Dilemma ($R=4.1$, $T=5$, $S=0$, $P=1$) in a structured population. Initially, all individuals exhibit zero altruism. As the simulation evolves, a group of mutant conditional defectors emerges, with an altruism level of approximately $\delta=0.2$ based on the given parameter values. It is notable that the advancing fronts of conditional cooperators consist of conditional cooperators at the front and unconditional cooperators in the middle area. This enables the conditional cooperators to defect with defectors and selectively cooperate with one another, ultimately invading the domain of defectors. As defectors diminish, the number of unconditional cooperators increases and often takes over from the conditional cooperators. However, during the transition, a small fraction of conditional cooperators remain within the population and typically reside at the borders of small defector domains. These conditional cooperators traverse the defector borders and purge the population of defectors, $N=40000$, $\nu=10^{-3}$.Supplementary Video 2 (SV 2) displays the evolutionary dynamics of a structured population of agents playing a Snowdrift game ($R=3$, $T=5$, $S=1$, $P=0$). Initially, all individuals exhibit selfish rationality with an altruism level of zero. However, mutant altruists quickly dominate the population, leading to a rise in cooperation. Over time, all individuals within the population gradually develop an altruism level close to $\delta=\delta_D$, resulting in almost complete cooperation. Parameter value: $N=40000$, $\nu=10^{-3}$.Supplementary Video 3 (SV 3) demonstrates the evolutionary dynamics of a structured population playing the Stag Hunt game ($R=3$, $T=2$, $S=0$, $P=1$). Initially, the simulation consists of selfish rational individuals who alternate between cooperation and defection. However, mutant altruists quickly dominate the population, resulting in the emergence of full cooperation. Parameter value: $N=40000$, $\nu=10^{-3}$.MatlabCodes: Matlab codes for "The Evolution of Altruistic Rationality Provides a Solution to Social Dilemmas via Rational Reciprocity" by Mohammad Salahshour and Iain Couzin. For further information see the Readme file in the folder.MatlabDataandFigures: Contains raw Matlab data and Matlab script to generate figures in "The Evolution of Altruistic Rationality Provides a Solution to Social Dilemmas via Rational Reciprocity" by Mohammad Salahshour and Iain Couzin. For further information see the Readme file in the folder.