Code for: Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents: Medicare Payments for Dialysis Drugs
收藏ICPSR2024-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/184263/version/V1/view
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资源简介：
We study health care provider agency and optimal payments, considering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel application of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessive dosages and reduce expenditures, resulting in approximately $300 million in annual gains from better contracting. This approach could be applied to a broad class of problems in health care payment policy.<br><br>
提供机构：
Lehigh University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Western Ontario
创建时间：
2024-01-01
