Relative Power and Costly Signals of Civilian Loyalty: Protest Behavior Against Armed Actors in the Colombian Civil War, 1990–2004

The paper examines one of many actions that civilians employ to resists peacefully armed actors during civil wars: protests. I argue that the costs for mobilizing against armed actors depend on the level of control that armed actors exert in the territory. By examining the civil war in Colombia between 1990 and 2004, I find that civilians protest against the weaker actor to reveal their loyalty to the dominant actor and to prevent the strong side from conducting future violent actions against the population. Protesting works as a costly signal of loyalty. I reveal that non-combatants protest against the stronger actor when both civilians and combatants share the same political ideology. In that circumstance, punishment by the strong combatants is improbable as protesting against them is likely to be interpreted as a renegotiation of the contract or a reminder of its terms. Finally, I show that civilians in contested zones declare themselves neutral and protest against both sides. Non-combatants take advantage of the power contestation to improve their current situation. Any punishment by combatants in contested zones would lead to defection, and citizens protest against both actors knowing that armed actors cannot afford to punish non-combatants for their hostile attitude.