MILITARY CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF EFFICACY (1941–1945)

This article is devoted to a historical and analytical examination of the conceptual foundations and practical efficacy of military deception (maskirovka) and strategic disinformation measures employed by the Soviet Armed Forces during World War II (1941–1945). The study provides a comprehensive analysis of operational and strategic diversionary actions, radio deception operations, the construction of dummy installations, and the impact of information security regimens on the decision-making processes of enemy intelligence services. Specifically, using the Battle of Stalingrad, the Kursk Salient, and Operation Bagration as case studies, the paper evaluates the expertise of Soviet military command in misleading the adversary both strategically and tactically. The findings demonstrate that camouflage and deception were not merely defensive components, but served as a crucial factor in securing the strategic initiative and achieving operational superiority.