Replication Data for: "Troops or Tanks: Rethinking Mechanization in Iraq"

Are some conventional military units better equipped to conduct counterinsurgency operations than others? Do dismounted units with reduced mechanisation levels help or hurt counterinsurgents? If there are divergent unit outcomes at the local level associated with government mechanisation, then this carries policy implications for how militaries equip, organize, and deploy in counterinsurgency campaigns. Using new data on the composition and disposition of coalition combat battalions in Iraq from 2004-2008, we analyze how varying coalition mechanisation levels impact district violence during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Challenging extant literature, our results suggest that counterinsurgent mechanisation levels are not a critical determinant of district violence in the aggregate. Rather, mechanisation’s effects vary by unit employment strategy and context. Governments must consider relative scope conditions like local violence levels and insurgent strength to employ the correct force structure in counterinsurgency operations. We suggest a closer examination of unit employment strategy through case studies in Ramadi and Basra to better explain these divergent outcomes.