Replication data for: Tying Hands without a Rope: Rational Domestic Response to International Institutional Constraints

Observers often argue that international institutions can promote policy reform by serving as a commitment device, “tying the hands” of national leaders who would otherwise be unable to reform due to opposition in the legislature, for instance. Can a leader “tie hands without a rope i.e., if the domestic opposition is rational and believes the institution probably lacks enforcement power? To find out, I develop an incomplete-information game theoretic model, in which the executive and legislature of a defendant country in a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute set trade policy. The model indicates that even leaders who know enforcement is not forthcoming (e.g., when the defendant is likely to prevail in a WTO ruling) can sometimes get significant liberalization approved by a protectionist legislature. Leaders can indeed tie their hands without (ex post) ropes. However, the model’s results contradict many aspects of conventional institutionalist theory. For instance, this tying hands function of the institution comes at the expense of additional gains when enforcement turns out to be more likely (e.g., when an adverse ruling is probable), so it does not add to the net expected level of liberalization. Moreover, the benefits of tying hands without a rope can only be realized before the institution issues prescriptions, and only then, ironically, if the transaction costs of utilizing the institution are sufficiently high. The model yields a number of additional testable hypotheses, concerning, for instance, the differential influence of the institution on unified and divided governments. Preliminary quantitative tests offer support for these hypotheses.