Decision making under stress: The “hiding behind a small cake” effect

These data report the results of experimental research that investigated the "hide behind the small cake effect". In this study, we implemented a laboratory experiment using the ultimatum game with asymmetric information, in which only the first mover was fully informed about the size of the endowment. Our experiment compared the decisions of subjects who received a stress stimulus from an adapted Trier Social Stress Test for Groups (TSST-G) protocol with a control group. We used the Tobit model in the regression analysis because we observed a sizable number of transfers equal to the smallest possible transfer (R$0) and the largest possible transfer (R$30). A Logit model was used when the dependent variable was a dummy for the proposed categories. We found that under stress, proposers transferred more to responders. In contrast, non-stressed players were more likely to take advantage of information asymmetry by choosing lower strategic offers, which is consistent with the so-called “hide behind a small cake” effect. Regression analysis also indicated that larger offers are not necessarily associated with increased prosocial motives since stressed proposers became more confident about the responder´s ability to guess the true endowment, which decreased their incentive to take advantage of the aforementioned effect.