Data and code for Incentives for information provision: Energy efficiency in the Spanish rental market

The data and code of the paper. In this paper we build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses' energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners' incentives to disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as previously documented - but also on the implicit rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs in the local market. This suggests that the enforcement of the EC regulation should be more stringent during the early phases, as the boost in the initial disclosure rate would strengthen the incentives for later adoption. We illustrate the theoretical predictions with empirical evidence from the Spanish rental market

本文档包含了论文的数据和代码。在该研究中，我们构建了一个考虑房屋能源效率信息不对称的搜索模型。研究目的在于揭示房东在租赁市场中披露能源证书（EC）的激励因素。此类激励不仅取决于高效房屋的租金溢价——如前所述——还与未标记房屋的隐性租金罚款有关。有趣的是，我们发现这种罚款与当地市场能源证书披露率成正比。这表明，在早期阶段，应加强能源证书法规的执行力度，因为初始披露率的提升将增强后续采用的激励。我们通过西班牙租赁市场的实证证据来阐述理论预测。