Does Congress Influence Federal Reserve Policy? Evidence from Shared Allegiance and Election Periods

I estimate various backward-looking and forward-looking Taylor rules augmented with variables that indicate proximity to an election and whether the Fed Chair and the majority of a chamber of Congress share the same political party affiliation to investigate whether Congress has influenced Federal Reserve policy from 1961 to 2020. I find that the Fed is susceptible to pressures from the Senate. In line with previous work, left-leaning politicians exhibit a higher tolerance for inflation. This results in the federal funds rate being lower by about 2.35 points when the Democratic party has a Senate majority. Second, while I find some evidence that the House and the Fed Chair sharing partisan affiliation results in tighter policy, this result is not robust to alternative measures of inflation. Finally, I find persuasive evidence that Congressional pressures on the Fed do not create a political monetary cycle around elections.