Replication Data for: Do Alliance Abandonment and Coercion Increase Support for Nuclear Weapons? An Elite Survey in NATO

Alliances are central to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Many scholars suggest that actions which might undermine allies’ faith in or dependence on the United States will in turn increase their interest in nuclear weapons. Yet this prediction has received only limited empirical attention. This research note tests whether U.S. signals of abandonment and efforts to encourage allied burden-sharing using threats of abandonment increase support for nuclear weapons acquisition, using a survey of foreign policy elites from sixteen European NATO members. The findings suggest U.S. threats to abandon allies unless they increase defense spending modestly increase support for nuclear weapons, but not as much as unconditional signals of diminished commitment such as a withdrawal of U.S. troops. The findings suggest that while U.S. signals of abandonment may undermine nonproliferation, there is less evidence that U.S. coercion has the same effect, or that there is a direct tradeoff between burden-sharing and nonproliferation.同盟体系是美国核不扩散工作的核心所在。诸多学者指出，任何可能削弱盟友对美国信任或依赖的举措，反过来都会提升其获取核武器的意愿。然而这一理论预判仅得到了有限的实证研究关注。本研究简报通过对16个欧洲北大西洋公约组织（NATO）成员国的外交政策精英开展问卷调查，检验美国发出的弃盟信号，以及以弃盟相威胁推动盟友分担防务负担的举措，是否会提升盟友支持研发核武器的倾向。研究结果显示，美国以要求盟友适度增加国防开支为条件的弃盟威胁，确实会提升盟友的拥核支持率，但其影响幅度不及美军撤军这类无条件弱化同盟承诺的信号。研究结果同时表明，尽管美国的弃盟信号可能会损害核不扩散进程，但鲜有证据显示美国的胁迫举措会产生同样的影响，也未发现防务负担分担与核不扩散之间存在直接的权衡关系。