Investigating the impact of environmental feedback on the optional prisoner's dilemma for insights into cyclic dominance and evolution of cooperation

This study incorporates environmental feedback into the optional prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors games to examine the mutual influence of eco-evolutionary outcomes and strategy dynamics. A novel game-theoretic model is developed that integrates the optional prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors games by incorporating an environmental state variable. By adjusting feedback parameters, chaos, oscillations and coexistence are observed that surpass the usual outcomes of social dilemmas when the environment transitions between depleted and replenished states. Defection is no longer advantageous in evolution; cooperation, abstention, and cyclic dominance arise. The observed transitions align with natural economics, ecology, and sociology phenomena. The inclusion of abstention options and environmental feedback has a significant impact on collective outcomes when compared to conventional games. This has important implications for studying adaptation and decision-making in situations with ecological constraints.