Data and Code for: Government Financing of R&D: A mechanism Design Approach".
收藏ICPSR2021-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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资源简介：
We study the optimal design of government R&D loans for risky projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal contract involves a high interest rate with zero co-financing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed programs. With adverse selection and moral hazard, with two effort levels by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy is a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest rate and zero self-financing, and a second with low interest and maximum feasible co-financing. Calibrated simulations compare welfare gains from the optimal contract, observed schemes and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms.
提供机构：
Tel Aviv University; London School of Economics; The Hebrew University
创建时间：
2021-01-01
