Replication Data for: Voice and Balancing in US Congressional Elections

If the median voter wrote the Constitution, every Tuesday would be Election Day. Consider the case of the US: Halfway into a presidential term, Congressional elections allow the people to adjust the course of federal policy. Two complementary mechanisms describe how this opportunity is embraced by centrists: a direct mechanism, which strengthens the out-party in Congress to “balance” the president’s policy impact; and an indirect mechanism, by which midterm voting serves to “voice” dissatisfaction as a signal to the president. A model of repeated elections unites the two mechanisms: While midterm balancing reacts to the preceding presidential election, midterm voice anticipates the following one. Using micro and macro data for all House elections of 1956-2018, I show that balancing and voice work hand-in-hand: It is those voters with both policy incentives who contribute most to the notorious “midterm loss,” and in particular under circumstances that make balancing more necessary and voice more promising. Yet while policy-oriented behavior typically restrains dominant parties, it may also cushion the fall of unpopular administrations. Centrists can be creative.