The evolution of negotiation strategies diversifies parental cooperation

Parental cooperation is not self-evident, as conflicts often arise over individual contributions. Evolutionary game theory suggests this conflict may be resolved through negotiation, where parents adjust their care level based on their partner’s contribution. However, mathematical negotiation models typically predict low parental cooperation. As these models are not dynamically explicit and mostly neglect stochasticity, we employ individual-based simulations to investigate how parental negotiation strategies evolve and shape care patterns. Our results differ markedly from earlier analytical predictions. Parental negotiation strategies readily evolve, producing four alternative care patterns: uniparental care, sex-biased care and two types of egalitarian biparental care, that occasionally emerge as transitional stages over evolutionary time. We found that effective cooperation evolved regularly but, contrary to common expectations, always relied on a Tit-for-Tat strategy rather than parental compensation. Our study underscores that diverse cooperative patterns in animals can emerge from sex-specific negotiation strategies, even in the absence of initial sex roles and environmental variation.All code scripts, simulation data and analysis scripts are included in this dataset