Data and Code for: "Profiting from Most-Favored Customer Procurement Rules: Evidence from Medicaid"
收藏ICPSR2023-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/155461/version/V1/view
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资源简介:
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that an increase to Medicaid's minimum drug rebate under the Affordable Care Act in 2010 lowered non-Medicaid drug spending by 2.5 percent. A stylized bargaining model shows that this is likely driven by the interaction of this reform with Medicaid's "most-favored customer" clause (MFCC). By examining the response of drugs that faced a change in incentives equivalent to the removal of Medicaid's MFCC, we estimate that removing the Medicaid MFCC would have reduced overall 2010 non-Medicaid drug spending by an additional 3.5 percent, though it would have likely also increased Medicaid spending.
提供机构:
University of Utah - Eccles School of Business; University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; Harvard Medical School
创建时间:
2023-01-01



