Data and Code for: Monitoring in Small Firms: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Public Transit

Small firms struggle to grow beyond a few employees. We introduce monitoring devices into commuter minibuses in Kenya and randomize which minibus owners have access to the data using a novel mobile app. We find that treated vehicle owners modify the terms of the contract to induce higher effort and lower risk-taking from their drivers. This reduces firm costs and increases firm profitability. There is suggestive evidence that some firms expand. These results suggest that small firms may be able to utilize monitoring technologies to overcome problems of moral hazard and enhance their profitability.

小型企业往往难以突破数名员工规模的限制。本研究在肯尼亚的通勤微型巴士中引入监控设备，并采用新颖的移动应用程序随机分配哪些微型巴士所有者能够访问这些数据。研究发现，接受处理的车辆所有者会修改合同条款，以诱使驾驶员付出更高的努力并降低风险承担。这降低了企业成本，并提升了企业的盈利能力。有迹象表明，部分企业实现了扩张。这些结果暗示，小型企业或许能够利用监控技术克服道德风险问题，并提升其盈利水平。