Data and Code for: "Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers"
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资源简介：
These files contain the source code for journal article "Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers". Abstract of article: We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition. <br><br><br>
提供机构：
Independent Researcher; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; HSBC Business School, Peking University; University of Maryland, College Park, CEPR and NBER
创建时间：
2022-01-01
