Pre-collected power consumption traces for the experiments in "Reading It like an Open Book: Single-trace Blind Side-channel Attacks on Garbled Circuit Frameworks"

Garbled circuits (GC) enable secure multiparty computation, but implementations can be vulnerable to side-channel attacks. We analyze popular GC frameworks and identify a vulnerability where AES encryption used in garbling is secret-dependent, exposing private inputs through side-channel analysis. We propose a single-trace attack to recover private inputs without access to plaintexts or ciphertexts, targeting both input and internal non-XOR gates.We evaluate our attack across different scenarios: software AES on a 32-bit ARM processor (100% success), hardware AES on an Artix-7 FPGA (79.58% success), and a cross-platform attack on processors with different microarchitectures (100% success). Our findings highlight the need to extend the non-colluding assumption in secure computation to include physical-layer protections.Our code for the experiments is open-sourced in:https://github.com/NomadShen/chipwhispererhttps://github.com/NomadShen/fpga_based_attack