Replication Data for: Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies

How can governments implement foreign economic policies that are popular amongst political elites but unpopular amongst their voters? Studying international financial rescues, we argue that governments strategically frame policies in an attempt to minimize their expected political costs, which increases their ability to implement those policies successfully. We theorize that framing strategies allow governments to offer financial bailouts, and we test the resulting hypotheses using an integrative mixed-methods approach. We trace the underlying causal mechanism of our argument with a typical case study of the U.S. bailout of Mexico during the 1995 Peso crisis, test whether a credible threat of migration increases the likelihood of bailouts using an original data set of bailouts by 36 OECD countries to 108 crisis countries over a time span of 40 years and analyze a central assumption of our theory with a survey experiment on over 3,000 U.S. residents.