Data underlying the publication: "Liquidity defaults and progressive lending in microfinance: A lab‐in‐the field experiment in Bolivia"

Many microfinance institutions (MFIs) use dynamic incentives in combination with progressive lending schemes to reduce defaults. However, the specific role of progressive lending has never been tested empirically, while observational evidence in other contexts points to potentially adverse effects. Using an experimental approach, we study the impact of progressive lending on overborrowing, attending to the possibility that progressive lending may actually increase liquidity defaults. We organize a framed field experiment in the municipality of Coroico, Bolivia, inviting 271 members of an MFI to participate in an experimental game. In Bolivia, the penetration rates of microfinance are among the highest in the world, progressive lending systems are a common practice, and the concept and practices of microfinance are well known among most people. We find that participants who borrowed over multiple rounds with progressively increasing borrowing caps showed increased liquidity defaults once the caps became unconstraining compared to those without progressive lending. We speculate that this result stems from anchoring borrowing loan requests on the credit limit set by the lender and formalize this rationale in a model for credit demand and naive borrowers. MFIs should consider the potential perverse anchoring effects of progressive lending when designing policies aimed at reducing overborrowing.

众多小额信贷机构（Microfinance Institutions, MFIs）会结合动态激励与渐进式放贷计划以降低信贷违约风险。然而，渐进式放贷的具体作用从未得到实证检验，而其他场景下的观测性证据则指向其可能产生的负面影响。本研究采用实验研究方法，探究渐进式放贷对过度借贷的影响，并关注渐进式放贷可能实际加剧流动性违约的可能性。我们在玻利维亚科罗伊科市镇开展了一项框架式田野实验，邀请某小额信贷机构的271名成员参与实验博弈。玻利维亚的小额信贷渗透率位居全球前列，渐进式放贷体系已是常见实践，且小额信贷的概念与操作流程在多数民众中广为人知。研究结果显示，与未采用渐进式放贷的参与者相比，那些在多轮借款中享受渐进式借款额度上限的参与者，一旦额度上限不再受限，其流动性违约率会出现上升。我们推测，该结果源于参与者将借款请求锚定在放贷机构设定的信贷额度上，并针对信贷需求与幼稚借款人构建了模型以正式阐释这一逻辑。小额信贷机构在设计旨在降低过度借贷的政策时，应考虑渐进式放贷可能带来的反常锚定效应。