Saving Jonathan Edwards' Ethics from Voluntarism

In this dissertation I save Jonathan Edwards’ ethics from leading interpretations of the last twenty years that have judged his metaphysical system to be implausible, bizarre, and incoherent. I “save” (or render coherent) Edwards’ metaphysical ethics by recontextualizing Edwards’ late works according to his own developing intentions. Next, I increase the plausibility of Edwards’ metaphysical by providing a new, clean presentation of his first principles alongside his theory of dual explanations (i.e. the vulgar/strict sense). Once we recontextualize Edwards’ metaphysics we see that it offers a coherent foundation upon which to build an ethical system. I then use these tools to vindicate Edwards’ metaphysical ethics from the charge that it is unacceptably voluntaristic. Again, by returning to Edwards’ context and sources we see that the “voluntarism” label is too broad. It is not one accusation, but as many as five. By distinguishing and explaining the various kinds of “voluntarism,” I show that Edwards is, on the contrary, an intellectualist on three fronts: human psychology, God’s relationship to morality, and God’s relationship to mathematics. As for the places where Edwards is “voluntaristic” – namely grace and election – I show that this commitment is trivially true in virtual of his Augustinian and Thomistic precedent. Edwards’ formulation of divine election incurs no new objection in contrast with that of Augustine and Aquinas. Edwards’ ethics should be retrieved today because his metaphysics has so much to offer moral theologians and philosophers.