Macroeconomic dynamics are shaped by how individual incentives to spend and accumulate interact with the decisions of others. The goal of this paper is to identifywithin a simple large-game-theoretic
These codes and output reproduce the results of the paper available in its preliminary version at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4890131 . Gilli, Mario and Sorrentino, Andrea, Characterization of th
Melioration learning is an empirically well-grounded model of reinforcement learning. By means of computer simulations, this paper derives predictions for several repeatedly played two-person games fr
uniformly distributed random points in the -simplex. In the case of , the mixed Forgiver equilibrium has a different composition than in the cases of , , . Parameter values: costs , error rate , numb
The source code below is used for the simulations reported in Jo (2011, Non-uniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model). The simulation is intended to show that when there are multiple
