Replication files for "State Capacity, Property Rights, and External Revenues: Haiti, 1932–1949"

This project contains the replication files for <i>State
Capacity, Property Rights, and External Revenues:</i>

<i>Haiti,
1932–1949.</i><br><br><b>Abstract<br></b>External revenues blunt investments
in fiscal capacity. But how do external revenues affect investments in legal
capacity? In a simple model of state capacity investment, external revenues
should be positively correlated with investments in legal capacity. But this
implication could flip if fiscal capacity lowers the cost of legal capacity
investments. I test the model by looking at Haiti in 1942 when U.S. mobilization
caused a negative shock to external revenues. Contrary to the basic model, the
shock led to an increase in legal capacity. This puzzle is explained by
institutions that tied fiscal and legal capacity investments.<b></b>