Replication package for: The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives

Name: Replication package for: The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives
Creator: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics; Columbia University, Department of Economics; Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics; University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy; Universidad de los Andes, Department of Economics
Published: 2020-01-01 00:00:00
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https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/111542/version/V1/view?path=/openicpsr/111542/fcr:versions/V1/Data/FPMunyear.dta&type=file

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资源简介：

We investigate the use of high-powered incentives for Colombian army members, and show that it produced several perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as ‘false positives’). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high- powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels (who have stronger career concerns than generals). In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security.

提供机构：

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics; Columbia University, Department of Economics; Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics; University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy; Universidad de los Andes, Department of Economics

创建时间：

2020-01-01