Replication Data for: Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors

Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46% higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64% higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.

搜集汇总

背景与挑战

背景概述

该数据集是2015年发布的关于税收人员绩效薪酬的实地实验数据，基于巴基斯坦旁遮普省482个财产税单位的实验。研究发现，绩效薪酬显著提高了税收收入（激励单位比对照组高46%增长率），但同时也增加了税收人员的议价能力，导致贿赂现象加剧；纯收入激励方案效果最佳，而客户满意度和评估准确性未受明显影响。