SatGrid Dataset, realtime genuine and spoofing traces of GPS signals collected at different geographical locations, times and environmental conditions

In order to spur the growth of GPS and ease its adoption by the private sector, all aspects of the design and implementation of the so-called L1 C/A (“Coarse Acquisition”) signal are made public. This openness along with lack of authentication has made it possible for a wide variety of attacks against GPS. Several defenses have been proposed to combat these attacks, but they are ultimately insufficient due to scope, expense, complexity, or robustness. With this in mind, we present our own solution: fingerprinting of GPS satellites. We assert that it is possible to create signatures, or fingerprints, of the satellites (more specifically their transmissions) that allow one to determine nearly instantly whether a received GPS transmission is authentic or not. We show that this solution detects all known spoofing attacks, that it does so while being fast, cheap, and simpler than previous solutions, and that it is highly robust with respect to environmental factors.
The authors wish to thank Dr. Ramin Baseri, Mr. John Lee, and Mr. Andrew Lee of CACI and Drs. Jeffrey Reed and Robert W. McGwier of Virginia Tech for their guidance on, and support of, the work.