Data from: Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment

Reputational considerations favour cooperation and thus we expect less
cooperation in larger communities where people are less well-known to each
other. Some argue that institutions are therefore necessary to co-ordinate
large-scale cooperation, including moralizing religions that promote
cooperation through the fear of divine punishment. Here, we use community
size as a proxy for reputational concerns, and test whether people in
small, stable communities are more cooperative than people in large, less
stable communities in both religious and non-religious contexts. We
conducted a donation game on a large naturalistic sample of 501 people in
17 communities, with varying religions or none, ranging from small
villages to large cities in northwestern China. We found that more money
was donated by those in small, stable communities, where reputation should
be more salient. Religious practice was also associated with higher
donations，but fear of divine punishment was not. In a second game on the
same sample, decisions were private, giving donors the opportunity to
cheat. We found that donors to religious institutions were not less likely
to cheat, and community size was not important in this game. Results from
the donation game suggest donations to both religious and non-religious
institutions are being motivated by reputational considerations, and
results from both games suggest fear of divine punishment is not
important. This chimes with other studies suggesting social benefits
rather than fear of punishment may be the more salient motive for
cooperative behaviour in real world settings.