Data and Code for: Dishonesty and public employment

We study the causal link between dishonest behavior in youth and the probability of working in the public sector later in life. Our empirical strategy exploits a natural experiment (the Argentine draft lottery) that provides exogenous variation in the incentives to engage in dishonest behavior during the impressionable years, in a real-world context with high-stake consequences. When military conscription was mandatory, eligibility was determined by both a lottery and a medical examination. To avoid conscription, individuals at risk of being drafted had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation in the incentives for draft evasion, we first present evidence of cheating in medical exemptions. We then show that individuals with a higher probability of having cheated in their health checks as young adults exhibit a higher propensity to occupy non-meritocratic public sector jobs later in life. This evidence suggests not only that cheating can be induced, but that it can also affect future behavior.