Replication Data for: The Long-Run Consequences of The Opium Concessions for Out-Group Animosity on Java

Looking at the Dutch East Indies, I examine the consequences of the opium concession system---an arrangement in which the Dutch would auction the monopolistic right to sell opium in a locality to the highest bidder. The winners of these auctions were invariably ethnic Chinese. The poverty of the indigenous population of Java, combined with the addictive properties of opium, meant that many fell into destitution at the hands of ethnic Chinese vendors. I argue that this institution put in motion a self-reinforcing arrangement that enriched one group and embittered the other, with present-day consequences. Consistent with this theory, I find that individuals in villages where the opium concession system was operative during the nineteenth century---compared to individuals in nearby unexposed counterfactual villages---report higher levels of outgroup intolerance. These findings improve our understanding of the historical conditions that structure antagonisms between competing groups.