THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION IN AN OPEN-LIST PR SYSTEM: INFORMAL CONSTITUENCIES, BUDGET AMENDMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN RIO DE JANEIRO

This article aims to highlight the effects of the electoral connection on the behavior of Brazilian legislators, examining specifically the Rio de Janeiro chamber of councillors. The analysis covers the fourteen-year period from 1997 and 2010. The decisive influence of the electoral connection on the councillors’ process of decision making in relation to the financing of public policies is presented through a set of multiple regressions. The results show contrasts between the mutually excluding perspectives of comparatists and specialists in Brazil. A more diversified description of the electoral connexion in OLPR system emerge. The discoveries show that the transformation of the constituent group from several formal members into many informal groups accommodates geographical and non-geographical representations. Although focused on Brazil, this article approaches a gap in the literature about OLPR systems, which are adopted in other aspects of national elections, in places such as Peru and Colombia, and in subnational elections, as in many states from Germany.