EBT_AfT_Dataset

The shift from general budget support to project-based aid has opened new spaces for donor-recipient preference contestation in bilateral aid negotiations that existing aid-for-policy models fail to capture. In response, this paper presents an Extended Bargaining Theory (EBT) of bilateral aid relations characterised by single-process triangular negotiating. In particular, the EBT accounts for project-specific design and implementation preferences as a third negotiation dimension alongside flow size and recipient policy concessions. The framework is empirically illustrated through the case of bilateral Aid for Trade. After constructing a relative bargaining power score for donor-recipient dyads and evaluating its influence on the three AfT negotiation outcomes, the paper finds that structural bargaining power simultaneously shapes all three negotiation outcomes in ways that differ meaningfully across dimensions and which are obscured by two-dimensional classic aid-for-policy models. Recipients and donors strategically trade off gains across dimensions as their relative bargaining position changes, primarily between the design and implementation and policy concessions dimensions. The paper finds that recipients can leverage stronger bargaining positions to secure larger dyadic AfT flows and greater project delivery control, while trade liberalisation concessions remain a non-negotiable donor demand.