five

Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs]

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heiDATA2017-04-05 更新2026-05-11 收录
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https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/citation?persistentId=doi:10.11588/DATA/10087
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资源简介:
I experimentally investigate the hypothesis that many people avoid lying even in a situation where doing so would result in a Pareto improvement. Replicating (Erat and Gneezy, Management Science 58, 723-733, 2012), I find that a significant fraction of subjects tell the truth in a sender-receiver game where both subjects earn a higher payoff when the partner makes an incorrect guess regarding the roll of a die. However, a non-incentivized questionnaire indicates that the vast majority of these subjects expected their partner not to follow their message. I conduct two new experiments explicitly designed to test for a 'pure' aversion to lying, and find no evidence for the existence of such a motivation. I discuss the implications of the findings for moral behavior and rule following more generally.
提供机构:
Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics
创建时间:
2016-01-01
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