Replication data for: The Hegemon's Purse: No Economic Peace Between Democracies

Cox & Drury extend the democratic peace literature from the domain of militarized conflict to economic sanctions. Their analysis of economic sanctions data from 1978 through 2000 finds that democracies are more likely to enact sanctions, but are less likely to do so against other democracies. In this article, we extend their analysis in three different ways: first, we improve their methodology and sample size; second, we examine interactions between variables, and third, we additional hypotheses . We find that the substantive effects of joint democracy on the likelihood of sanctions disappear after accounting for the disproportionate role of the United States (and correcting for method), that the United States has a significantly different pattern of implementing sanctions than other states, and that the trade dependence of a potential sender plays a significant role in determining the likelihood of sanctions.