Opportunism and the Role of Financial Incentives: An Experimental Analysis Based on Game Theory

ABSTRACT In this study, we measured how people would take advantage of others’ misinformation, when the financial incentive size changes in economic games. We conducted a laboratory experiment based on game theory, using a modified version of the ultimatum game, where proposers had the opportunity to manipulate the responder’s beliefs by the use of ‘hide behind the small cake’ strategy. Our results contradict the selfish rationality model predictions. Intermediary financial incentives led people to adopt extremes strategies of pure fair/selfish allocation. Greater levels of financial incentive reduced the full expropriation strategy and at the same time, reduced the presence of fair offers, which suggests an interesting interaction between opportunism and psychological costs of lying. The results showed that opportunism is hugely context-dependent and people will update their decision regarding opportunism in accordance with the financial size incentive. Thus, the same person can behave differently depending on the financial value involved and will not necessarily be more selfish when the financial amount increases.

摘要：本研究旨在探究人们在经济游戏中，面对不同规模的财务激励时，如何利用他人的错误信息。本研究基于博弈论，通过修改版的最后通牒游戏进行实验室实验，其中提议者有机会通过‘躲在小型蛋糕之后’的策略来操纵响应者的信念。研究结果与自私理性模型预测相悖。中介财务激励导致人们采取纯粹公平/自私的分配策略。更高的财务激励水平降低了全面剥夺策略，同时减少了公平出价的频率，这暗示了机会主义与说谎的心理成本之间的有趣互动。结果表明，机会主义高度依赖情境，人们会根据财务激励的规模更新其对机会主义决策的看法。因此，同一个人可能因涉及的财务价值不同而表现出不同的行为，且财务金额增加并不一定导致其变得更加自私。