Replication Data for: Buying Brokers: Electoral Handouts beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State

Studies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote-buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout-buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? We analyze candidates’ distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates’ cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, we find heavy spending, but little evidence of vote-buying or turnout-buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers more than voters: with little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. Consistent with our argument that these are non-contingent payments, we find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior.